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This research explores why locally based Islamist militant groups, on occasion, tend to be 
unaffiliated or at best, loosely connected with broader transnational militant Islamist 
organizations such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This is an intriguing 
empirical puzzle given the extent of linkages that a vast multitude of localized Jihadists have 
forged with global/regional Jihadi counterparts such as Al-Qaeda.  Using the Allied Democratic 
Forces (ADF) – a militant Islamist group operating in the Ugandan-Congolese borderland, as a 
detailed case study, this research investigates the conditions under which significant linkages 
with transnational Islamists are less likely.  
The formation, durability and characteristics of alliances between terrorist groups have 
been the subjects of considerable academic scrutiny.1 In particular, many studies have explored 
the nature of alliance patterns between militant Islamist organizations with much research 
focused on the interaction between Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates.2  
In a similar vein, this study limits itself to an examination of the relations (or lack 
thereof) between militant groups based on an Islamic ideology. This is primarily motivated by 
the preeminence of Al-Qaeda and its impressive array of ties with regional Islamists. Moreover, 
ISIS has rapidly emerged as a significant challenger to Al-Qaeda with a growing number of local 
and regional militant outfits pledging allegiance to the group. Given this context of ever 
expanding transnational ties, it is opportune to investigate why some militant Islamists do not 
develop links with one another.  The study is further limited to groups espousing a broad Salafi 
Jihadist ideology. Such groups subscribe to a pious form of Islam, generally consonant with its 
early ancestors. Salafi Jihadists aim to return Islam to its pristine glory, overthrow apostate 
regimes, condemn non-conformists and eradicate detrimental outside influences.3  The focus on 
such movements is warranted given the 58% increase in the number of Salafi-Jihadist groups 
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from 2010-13.4 Restricting the study exclusively to Salafist groups also allows for greater 
conceptual clarity and facilitates making relevant generalizations.  
The authors contend that in order to explain the absence of ties between some militant 
Islamist organizations, it is helpful to delineate the circumstances conducive to the development 
of such ties, in the first place. Studies show that alliances are more likely when a partnership 
confers mutual benefits to both parties. For instance, transnationals like Al-Qaeda gain by getting 
a wider platform to export their ideology and being offered safe havens in areas controlled by 
local militants. Locals, on the other hand, benefit through improved training, military experience, 
financial/logistical assistance and greater name recognition. As discussed later, there is much 
heterogeneity in the scope and strength of relations between local Islamists and their more 
transnational partners. Theorizing such variation (which ranges from official affiliation to 
vaguely suspected ties) is also useful for understanding why alliance patterns may be tenuous or 
non-existent in some cases. The strength of inter-Islamist linkages is contingent on myriad 
different factors. These include the extent of ideological incompatibility, the degree of salience 
to the local community and other relevant actors and apprehension at being a more visible target 
of counter-terrorist operations.   
Based on the foregoing theoretical summary and an in-depth examination of the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF), this study advances the argument that meaningful linkages between 
the ADF and transnational Islamist movements such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS are unlikely, at least in 
the foreseeable future. First, while the ADF retains a nominally Salafi outlook, the importance 
accorded to an Islamist agenda in practice is ambiguous, at best. The ADF has been labeled as 
multi-layered and comprising of several disparate factions with varied grievances and agendas 
and there is no clear evidence that an extremist Jihadist agenda overrides ADF's worldview.5 
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Further, the ADF is presently active in an area that has less than 10% Muslim population and has 
very little history of radicalism. Hence, the ADF is unlikely to advance the ideological 
prerogatives of global Jihadists. Second, in spite of its Ugandan origins, the ADF has long been 
embedded in eastern Congolese society through extensive involvement in the economy and the 
informal trans-border trade, intermarriage and similar cultural traits. This has facilitated ADF’s 
immersion into the larger Congolese conflict, provided collaborative opportunities with other 
rebel groups in the area and boosted the recruitment of Congolese non-Muslims into their ranks. 
The coexistence between the ADF and the local community, while being uneasy at times and 
punctuated with occasional civilian abuses by the ADF, has generally prevailed due to mutual 
interests. However, this relationship has sharply deteriorated since early 2013 as the ADF carried 
out numerous attacks against the civilian population in its area of operations. Given this context 
of rapidly worsening ties, an entrenched relationship with transnational Islamists could further 
aggravate tensions and is unlikely to resonate favorably with the local community. Third, the 
Ugandan government has often portrayed the ADF as an agent of Al-Qaeda in order to justify 
crackdowns and muster international support. Hence, more visible ties with external Islamist 
militants will likely invite ADF more attention from the Ugandan authorities as well as other 
regional/global actors. Therefore, the fear of attracting new enemies may serve as an effective 
deterrent against the development of robust linkages, particularly in light of the seemingly 
limited utility of an alliance.    
 
Forging Salafi Jihadist alliances 
 A survey of the literature reveals that Al-Qaeda has undergone a dramatic transformation 
in recent times. Beginning in the 1990s, Al-Qaeda has actively sought to expand its international 
4 
 
reach by building alliances with militant Islamist groups around the world. The decentralization 
of the movement gathered momentum in the post- 9/11 era following the removal of the Taliban 
regime and Al-Qaeda’s loss of sanctuary in Afghanistan. Today, Al-Qaeda prides itself on being 
a global franchise that brings together a heterogeneous constellation of disparate groups based as 
far afield as Indonesia, and Yemen. Indeed, some argue that the Al-Qaeda network consists of an 
“umbrella of 30-40 Asian, African, Middle Eastern groups,”6 while others note that the group has 
cells in nearly 70 countries.7 Similarly, ISIS has dramatically expanded its international reach 
recently and notable Jihadists such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Libya’s Ansar al-Sharia and 
Egypt’s Supporters of Jerusalem, have publicly declared allegiance with ISIS. Indeed, 60 Jihadist 
organizations in nearly 30 countries had reportedly pledged support to ISIS by November 2014.8  
While Al-Qaeda and ISIS have formed ever expanding strategic ties with local Islamists, it is 
worth noting that these relations are very heterogeneous in character. Much of the discussion that 
follows is based on the tremendous diversity that exists within the set of formal and informal alliances 
that Al-Qaeda  has cultivated. As the ISIS led network is still in its formative stages, the scarcity of 
reliable academic sources precludes a careful examination of intra-network variations with 
regard to ISIS. 
 Scholars posit that the Al-Qaeda franchise can be divided into several tiers.  Some groups have 
formally merged with the Al-Qaeda core based in Pakistan. They take direct orders, consult closely 
with Al-Qaeda and some have even absorbed the Al-Qaeda name. Examples include the Yemen based 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Pennisula (AQAP),  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Nusra in 
Syria and Al- Shabaab in Somalia.9 Numerous other Jihadist movements, while not formally affiliated 
with the Al- Qaeda core, have shared informal ideological and operational ties with the group. 
Examples include Ansar-al-Sharia in Libya, Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and Jemaah Islamiyah in 
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Southeast Asia.10 Similarly, others, like the western China based East Turkestan Movement (ETIM) 
and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines have developed loose, periodic affiliations with Al-
Qaeda.11 
There are also several instances of affiliate-affiliate relations within the Al-Qaeda network. For 
example, AQAP and Al-Shabaab are believed to have extensively cooperated with each 
other.12Similarly, AQIM and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) cultivated significant linkages in the early 
2000s.13 Further, AQIM has forged operational/ideological ties with several African groups including 
Boko Haram and the Mali based Ansar-Dine.14  
Some groups like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Jihad (LIFG) and the Egyptian Gamaat al-
Islamiyya developed strategic partnerships with Al-Qaeda and subsequently withdrew from them 
for a variety of reasons.15  Two groups based in the restive southern Philippines, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group have increasingly diminishing 
connections with transnational Jihadists.16 
The above discussion has provided a microcosm of the diversity in relations between 
Islamist militants. However, some Jihadist groups are characterized by a complete absence of 
ties with transnationals like Al-Qaeda or the evidence of linkages is extremely inconclusive. 
These include prominent exemplars such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood,17 but, also, 
multiple insurgency movements in the Muslim dominated southern Thailand,18 the ADF in the 
Ugandan- Congolese border and several Salafi Jihadist movements in the Gaza Strip.19 It is this set of 
cases that underpins the research question  motivating this study: what explains the absence of bonds 
between  certain Jihadist movements? 
 
Rationale for case selection 
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 The case of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is used to illustrate why militant 
Islamist linkages are elusive at times. There is little credible evidence that the ADF has forged 
meaningful ties with foreign Islamist militants in spite of the Ugandan government’s intermittent 
allegations of the ADF developing ties with Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.20 The ADF was chosen 
as the case study for several reasons. First, there is growing attention on Islamic militancy in 
Africa, particularly with rising Jihadi activity in countries such as Mali, Libya and Algeria and 
the growing notoriety of groups like Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. Alexander suggests that the 
proliferation of Jihadist movements across Africa has created a “trans-Saharan arc of 
instability.”21 Some have dubbed the continent “Afrighanistan,” implying that parts of Africa are 
becoming a fertile breeding ground for Jihadi terrorism.22  Further, several of the African groups 
have formed a string of operational and ideological ties with regional Islamist militants.23 Indeed, 
the focus on the ADF is especially warranted given Al-Shabaab’s deepening connections with 
Islamist militants in Kenya.24 Such ties have fueled fears that the group may attempt to expand 
its links across East Africa, particularly given Al-Shabaab’s previous history of conducting 
terrorist attacks on Ugandan soil.25 Given this context, the dearth of substantiated links between 
the ADF and other Islamists makes the group an intriguing anomaly and worthy of further 
exploration.  
 Second, the ADF operates in an environment similar to where inter-Jihadi ties have 
flourished in Nigeria, Somalia, Libya and Mali. Specifically, it is based in an area characterized 
by weak central government authority, porous boundaries and rugged terrain. Such conditions 
can often be conducive to the development of militant linkages.26 The ADF, in fact, has 
capitalized on such factors and formed sporadic alliances with several rebel outfits in the DRC.27 
However, crucially, not one of these partnerships has been with a militant Islamist group. 
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 Third, it is opportune to study the ADF more closely as the group has increasingly been 
in the spotlight recently. After being quiescent for some time, the ADF carried out a series of 
devastating attacks on civilians in the DRC over the last two years and became embroiled in 
sustained fighting with the Congolese army.28  Furthermore, the group has been accused of 
killing Muslim clergy members in Uganda in early 2015.29  This recent escalation in ADF 
militancy has reignited interest in the group and raised questions whether the surge in violence is 
linked to assistance/influence from other Jihadist groups.  
 
Theorizing terrorist networks  
 Before addressing why the ADF has not cultivated linkages with other militant Islamists, 
it is imperative to engage in a theoretical discussion on the nature of terrorist alliances.  Two 
questions, in particular, are salient: 1) why do terrorist networks develop in the first place and 2) 
what factors could possibly account for the diversity in alliances between terrorist groups? 
 A strategic partnership between a locally based militant Islamist group and a 
transnational Islamist movement is more likely when there is a symbiotic relationship between 
partners. Both parties may gain from ideological congruence, aggregation of 
resources/capabilities and operational specialization, among others. 30 The following discussion 
explores the specific parameters of this synergy.  
 
Benefit to transnational Islamists 
Groups like Al-Qaeda encourages supporters to wage a holy Jihad against those that it 
perceives as enemies of Islam. Specifically, the United States and other Western allies are 
believed to be a waging a global conspiracy against Islam with the aim of marginalizing the 
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wider Muslim community. 31 Al Qaeda needs to expand its global franchise for myriad different 
reasons. First, affiliation affords Al-Qaeda an excellent opportunity to propagate its doctrine to 
an ever wider audience.32 Second, as Al-Qaeda’s ideology reaches a wider audience, there has 
been an increase in affiliate groups willing to carry out acts of Jihad, at local, regional and global 
levels.33 In particular, some affiliates have shown an increasing propensity to target Western 
interests.34 Third, in a post 9/11 context, with Al-Qaeda at the receiving end of stringent and on-
going counter-terrorism measures, the group increasingly found itself under siege. In this 
context, alliance building has enabled the group to sustain its mission and to a certain extent, its 
operations.35 Fourth, cultivating strategic partnerships is crucial given Al-Qaeda’s lack of 
popular support amongst the wider Muslim community. For instance, polling data collected by 
the Pew Global Attitudes Survey in seven Muslim majority countries from 2003-2009 showed a 
clear trend in declining public confidence in Osama bin Laden.36   
 Linkages with local groups provide global Jihadists bases to take sanctuary in. Studies on 
militant activity in Pakistan indicate that Al-Qaeda received various levels of assistance from 
local militant groups. One group in particular, Lashkar-e-Taiba, provided safe houses and was 
active in facilitating Al-Qaeda movement in Pakistan.37 Similarly, Jemaah Islamiyah received 
sanctuary from local militants based in the southern Philippines as the Indonesian and Malaysian 
governments intensified their crackdown in line with the US led global campaign against 
terrorism.38 
 
Benefit to local Islamists 
  Local militants benefit from accreditation with transnational groups through the training 
of combatants, emulation of tactics and the provision of financial and logistical support.  A 
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number of Al-Shabaab training camps in Somalia were conducted by foreigners with close 
connections to Al-Qaeda.39 In a similar vein, Lashkar-e-Taiba, AQAP and Boko Haram militants 
received training in camps controlled by Al-Qaeda or affiliates. In such camps, local militants are 
instructed on strategies ranging from suicide bombing to guerilla warfare and exposed to 
sophisticated weaponry, which often leads to the transplanting of such tactics in the local 
theatre.40 Al-Qaeda’s vast recruitment network has also enabled local Jihadists to attract foreign 
fighters to their cause.41 In some cases, local militants team up with foreign Jihadists when they 
face setbacks such as military defeat or loss of recruitment and thus, in need of fortification.42  
Numerous local Islamists have received financial and logistical assistance from foreign 
Jihadists. Examples include Al-Qaeda’s financial inducements to Al-Shabaab, the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group. Similarly, Al-Qaeda’s formal affiliate, 
AQIM, has rendered financial assistance to several local Jihadist groups in Africa including 
Boko Haram and Ansar Dine.43 
As a locally based militant group waging parochial battles, its salience is often confined 
to its own operating sphere. Hence, banding together with Al-Qaeda and “officially” becoming a 
part of the global franchise gives them an almost irresistible lure through greater name 
recognition. The Algerian based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) officially 
changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in early 2007.  It was believed 
that a name change could reinvigorate its militant base, enhance its legitimacy amongst radical 
Islamists internationally and bring greater “prestige” to the group.44  
 
Variation in the strength of Jihadi alliances 
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As previously noted, there is tremendous variation within the set of formal and informal 
alliances that Islamist militants have formed with each other. Further, some groups have 
subsequently ended up retracting linkages. Such variation in outcome is an intriguing empirical 
puzzle and this section aims to hypothesize conditions that could shed light on the differing 
strength, scope and patterns of terrorist networks.  
 
Ideological incongruence  
It is evident that the Salafi Jihadist movement comprises a range of ideological opinions 
open to multiple interpretations. Clear fissures have emerged on several issues and such divisions 
have often contributed to the disparate nature of alliance patterns. 45 One issue of contention is 
the identification of the primary target for Jihadists, encapsulated in the “far enemy vs. near 
enemy” debate. Global Jihadists like Al-Qaeda focus primarily on the “far enemy”- United States 
and other Western countries deemed to be responsible for the marginalization and persecution of 
Islam. In contrast, local Salafi Jihadists are often preoccupied with the “near enemy” – apostate 
regimes in their own region. While Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri stressed on the 
importance of making “America bleed,” local Islamists are more concerned with battling un-
Islamic governments in their own neighborhood. 46    This tension, has obstructed Al-Qaeda from 
forging closer ties with Boko Haram, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Ansar-Dine as these groups consider 
Nigeria, India and Mali (rather than the United States) respectively as their primary adversary.47 
There is also much disagreement on the extent of Islamic governance that Jihadists envision. Al-
Qaeda seeks to establish a global Islamic caliphate that unites Muslims in Asia, Africa, Europe 
and the Middle East. Other Jihadi groups espouse less expansive ambitions; ISIS has declared a 
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caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and Ansar al-Sharia 
(Libya) aims at Islamic governance in Libya.48   
 One of the more pressing ideological issues for Salafi Jihadists is the takfir question –
who is a “real” Muslim? Secular regimes in Muslim majority countries, apostates and heretics 
are often branded as unbelievers by radical Islamists.49 The designation of co-religionists as 
unbelievers has grave implications on how victims/targets are selected and has caused dissension 
within the Jihadi fraternity.50 Hardcore Jihadists like Al-Qaeda advocate a more extreme takfir 
position. For example, they excoriate Shia Muslims as unbelievers for what they consider to be 
irreconcilable theological differences and advocate violence against the latter. This is in stark 
contrast to groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood that staunchly champion Muslim unity and 
oppose dissecting intra-religious differences.51 
A more uncompromising stance on the takfir issue can widen a group’s likely target base 
and increases the possibility of violence on other Muslims and civilians.  However, it threatens a 
group’s actual and potential alliances with other militants as the more moderate Jihadists balk at 
the likelihood of violence against civilians. Local Jihadists in Chechnya and southern Thailand as 
well as the LIFG in Libya rejected closer cooperation with Al-Qaeda owing to the latter’s 
deliberate targeting of civilians.52  In some cases, the Al-Qaeda core has also been concerned 
about the excessively violent tendencies of certain affiliates and urged groups such as the AQI 
and the Pakistan Taliban (TTP) to be more discriminate in target selection.53 Moderate Salafi 
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood rejects violence “outside of carefully defined domains” 
and has unequivocally denounced the 9/11 attacks as well as other violent incidents carried out 
by Al-Qaeda and affiliates.54  
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 The extent of engagement with existing political institutions has also caused discord 
amongst Jihadists. Al-Qaeda’s ambitions of creating a global Islamic caliphate that transcends 
prevailing state boundaries is clearly at odds with various local Jihadists that situate their 
struggle within the nation-state and show willingness to engage with the existing national 
government.55 Further, radical Salafi Jihadists seek to replace democracy with Sharia law. 
Hence, movements such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are roundly berated for 
participating in elections and the broader political process. The Brotherhood’s strategy of 
attempting to effect change by working within existing institutions is anathema to Al-Qaeda’s 
preferred vision of repudiating the prevailing political system.56 
 
Degree of salience to the local community 
 Studies suggest that the durability of an alliance between global and local Jihadists is 
conditional on how such a partnership resonates with the local population. As Byman observes, 
preference diversion obstructs meaningful Jihadi linkages.57 In the Gaza Strip, many local 
Jihadists place importance on attacking internet cafes and video stores that they perceive as 
symbols of impurity. While Al-Qaeda may share this sentiment in general, such targets are not a 
high priority for them.58 Conversely, Al-Qaeda’s preoccupation with issues like the Danish 
cartoons that mocked Prophet Mohammed did not hold the same level of importance to Iraqi 
Jihadists more concerned with local issues.59  Haynes argues that a sustained nexus between 
local and foreign Islamists is unlikely in the East African region. For centuries, East African 
Muslims have been apolitical (in matters of religion) and followed a “relatively liberal and 
mystical brand of Islam” far removed from the radical version championed by global Jihadists. 
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Even in Muslim majority Zanzibar, with its litany of grievances, groups that seek a more Islamic 
agenda have chosen to do so through negotiation and discussion.60  
 Embracing a more global agenda represents an opportunity cost for local militants in 
that it takes away resources that could be devoted towards more parochial objectives.  This, in 
turn, can lead to cracks in the Jihadi network. For instance, while participation in elections might 
threaten the ideological purity of global Jihadists, local Jihadists perceive them as a gilt-edged 
opportunity to defend and better their communities.61 Similarly, tensions arose within Al-
Shabaab and Ansar Dine, as factions in each group sought to maintain dialogue and engagement 
with their respective national governments in spite of pressure from Al –Qaeda and AQIM to 
sever ties.62 Groups such as AQAP and Al-Nusra became more cognizant of the need to continue 
the provision of social services to locals to secure their support even as they came under 
increasing influence from foreign Islamists with different priorities.63  
 Partnership with global Jihadists can attract more foreign fighters to a local cause; 
however their strict adherence to a global agenda and lack of familiarity with indigenous mores 
can estrange local supporters.  The presence of foreigners in the higher echelons of Al-Shabaab 
and forced marriages to foreign fighters were resented by many Somalis.64 Puritanical practices 
of foreign Islamists often leading to the brutalization of the local Sufi population and the 
destruction of venerated cultural symbols were deeply despised by local communities in Mali,65 
Afghanistan66 and Somalia.67 
 Issue salience is also pertinent for the Al-Qaeda core. Affiliation poses the risk of 
contaminating Al-Qaeda’s ideological brand as the group wrestles with the diverse agendas of 
local Jihadists. Two cases from the southern Philippines are instructive. First, the Abu Sayyaf 
Group increasingly fell out of favor with Al-Qaeda as the former changed its focus from 
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embracing global Jihad to banditry and criminal activity.68 Second, the MILF’s continued 
dalliance with the infidel Philippine state proved ideologically unpalatable to Al-Qaeda.69  
For a Jihadist relationship to be robust, a balance has to be struck between global and 
local agendas. The AQAP has seemingly balanced this dual agenda better than most.70 It has 
done so by carrying out high profile attacks abroad while at the same time being able to 
effectively channel local grievances. The group has emphasized the inviolable sanctity of tribal 
land, played on longstanding tribal fears of outside influence and used such notions to justify 
their attacks.71 Further, as Loidolt notes, AQAP has categorically linked its goals to widely held 
grievances against the Yemeni government; namely, corruption, political oppression and its lack 
of Islamic credentials. Such strategic “packaging” of its agenda has enabled the group to 
maintain salience amongst the local population.72 
 
Fear of attracting new enemies 
 One notable downside of cultivating visible links with global Jihadists is that local 
Islamists could attract considerable scrutiny from law enforcement authorities. Particularly, in 
the midst of a concerted global campaign against terrorism, conspicuous ties with groups such as 
Al-Qaeda or ISIS increase the possibility of a local Jihadist group being subject to more stringent 
counter-terrorism measures. The likelihood of attracting new adversaries may serve as a 
deterrent as local groups ponder the pros and cons of a transnational alliance.73  
 Some sources suggest that Al-Shabaab delayed officially aligning with Al-Qaeda as it 
feared more attention from Western counter-terrorism organizations.74 Declassified documents 
captured from the Abbottabad raid that led to the death of bin Laden suggests that the former Al-
Qaeda leader discouraged Al-Shabaab from a formal union as it would encourage greater 
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“enemy” mobilization against Somalia.75 AQIM’s formal affiliation with Al-Qaeda expedited 
American led military operations against the group and also encouraged greater security 
cooperation between Algeria and Morocco.76 Similarly, as AQAP became closer to Al-Qaeda, 
the group was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US State Department 
and as an Al-Qaeda connected entity by a UN Committee established pursuant to the Security 
Council Resolution 1267.77  
 Even limited, unverified or inconsistent linkages with global Jihadists may put local 
Islamists at risk.  Arab financial assistance to Islamist militants in Chechnya was depicted as an 
extension of Al-Qaeda’s global Jihad by Russian President Putin.78 Likewise, Al-Qaeda’s 
sporadic ties to the ETIM led Uighur separatists in China allowed the Chinese government to 
frame its security operations in the region as part of the global war on terror.79  
 In summation, the foregoing discussion suggests that linkages between foreign and local 
Islamists are more likely when the relationship is symbiotic in nature and confers benefits to both 
sides. The literature indicates that multiple factors such as the extent of disagreement on a range 
of ideological issues, the degree of relevance to the local community and potentially attracting 
more attention from counter-terrorist operatives are helpful in explaining variations in the scope 
and depth of Jihadi relations. As the following section engages in a detailed examination of the 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the above theoretical discussion is useful for understanding 
why inter-Jihadi linkages are less likely in some cases.  
 
Case Study: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 
Origins and timeline 
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 The ideological roots of the ADF grew in the 1980s in central Uganda as a response to 
the Ugandan government’s perceived discrimination of its Muslim population.80  The precursor 
to the ADF was the Ugandan Mujahidin Freedom Fighters, an armed group instituted by The 
Islamic Salaf Foundation and composed mainly of members of the puritanical Tabligh sect.81 
Sect members recruited militants through a well-organized network to protest the 
marginalization of Muslims. A controversial decision by the Ugandan Supreme Court in 1992 to 
rule in favor of a rival Muslim group further radicalized the Tabligh movement.82  They 
retaliated violently, fled to western Uganda and engaged the Ugandan military in sustained 
fighting. After a series of defeats, the Tabligh retreated to the DRC, from where they established 
the ADF in 1996, under the leadership of Jamil Mukulu.83  
While the ADF’s origins are in central Uganda, the group’s principle theatre of 
operations has long been the Rwenzori mountainous region that straddles western Uganda and 
the eastern DRC.84  The group’s presence in this region is far from coincidental.  The distinctive 
characteristics of the Rwenzori borderland presented the ADF with multiple opportunities. Weak 
central government control on either side of the border allowed the ADF to carry out attacks with 
impunity and exploit opportunities for collusion with other rebel groups embroiled in the wider 
Congolese war. Moreover, similar cultural traits and a tradition of cross-border interaction 
hastened the development of transnational networks. 85  
Further, the region has a long history of contentious mobilization, largely due to the 
efforts of the Rwenzururu Resistance Movement. The movement fought against the colonial 
administration and several Ugandan governments for political autonomy and declared a 
secessionist kingdom in the region in 1962. While a political settlement was enacted in the 
1980s, some factions within the movement were disgruntled at the extent of political change and 
17 
 
resumed armed struggle. One such faction established the National Liberation Movement for 
Uganda (NALU) in the late 1980s and fled to the DRC following military defeat by the Ugandan 
army. 86 
In 1996, NALU formed an association with the ADF in the city of Beni in eastern DRC. 
Several common denominators united the two groups; distrust of the Ugandan regime of Yoweri 
Museveni, their presence on Congolese soil and external support provided by the Sudanese and 
Congolese governments.87 The ADF-NALU partnership carried out numerous attacks in the 
1990s; conservative estimates indicate that over 1,000 people were killed and over 100,000 
displaced from 1996-2001.88 Prominent targets included police stations, administrative buildings 
and schools. The campaign of terror spread fear through the civilian population and torpedoed 
the economy. According to some estimates, tax revenue dropped dramatically and the ubiquitous 
presence of landmines undermined agricultural productivity.89  
 The Ugandan military sought consent from the Kabila regime in the DRC and deployed 
troops across the border in 1998 to combat the ADF threat. Multiple leaders were killed or 
captured and the movement was largely destabilized by 2002. The rebels retreated deeper into 
the DRC and the departure of the Ugandan troops in 2003 allowed the ADF-NALU alliance to 
regroup through vigorous recruitment.  The next few years were punctuated by intermittent 
attacks by the ADF and military offensives launched by the Ugandan army, Congolese army and 
the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC). In 2007, the ADF lost its NALU component as the latter 
surrendered and acquiesced to a political settlement with the Ugandan government. 90 
After a period of relative dormancy, interspersed with occasional bouts of violence,91 
there has been a significant resurgence in ADF activity over the last two years. A series of 
devastating attacks on civilians in the eastern DRC has been blamed on the ADF.92 Moreover, 
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Operation Sukola I, launched against the ADF by the Congolese army and the UN Mission in the 
DRC (MONUSCO)93 in January 2014, has also escalated the level of violence.94 Human Rights 
Watch estimates that 175 civilians were killed in Beni in the last three months of 2014 and a 
report by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reveals 
rampant abuses by the ADF including executions, kidnappings, abduction of children, rape and 
the systematic destruction of property.95  Moreover, there have been reports of attacks inside 
Uganda, including the alleged assassinations of Muslim clergy members in early 2015.96 While 
there is absolutely no doubt that the level of violence unleashed by the ADF against civilians has 
dramatically escalated in the last two years, some analysts caution that it is not clear whether the 
group alone is responsible for all attacks in the Beni area given the presence of other militant 
groups in the region.97 
 The ADF suffered several battlefield defeats in 2014 and the militants were dislodged 
from several bases in North Kivu and forced to flee into the forest.  It is reported that the ADF 
fragmented into smaller groups to improve their chances of avoiding detection from the 
advancing Congolese forces.98 Many senior commanders of the ADF are still missing; however, 
after a protracted search, ADF’s leader, Mukulu, was arrested by the Tanzanian police in Dares 
Salaam in April 2015. At the time of writing, a Tanzanian court has just cleared Mukulu’s 
extradition to face trial in Uganda on multiple charges of incitement of violence.99  
 
Ideology and motivations 
 ADF’s inception can be traced to a core group of puritanical Muslims from the Tabligh 
movement. The Salaf sect is considered to be part of the Tabligh and it is alleged that the ADF is 
mainly made up of Salafi Muslims.100   ADF’s leader, Mukulu, is a strong adherent of Salafi 
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Islam and has indicated his desire to overthrow the government of Uganda and establish an 
Islamist state based on Sharia law. The ADF has distributed incendiary tape recordings of 
Mukulu that urge followers to wage a holy Jihad, carried out forcible conversions of non-
Muslims and meted punishments in accordance with Islamic law. However, as discussed later, 
the importance of Islamic ideology to the group as a whole is a matter of contention.101  The 
ADF is often described as a “rebellion without a cause.” The group has no clear-cut political 
program and its goals are open to debate.  
 
Recruitment, financing and networks 
 ADF has a far-reaching recruitment network that has managed to withstand repeated 
offensives by the Ugandan, Congolese and UN authorities. The ADF resorts to both voluntary 
and involuntary recruitment. Voluntary recruitment methods include personal invitations by 
existing members of the group and the use of Muslim clerics to encourage recruitment at 
mosques and schools. Many combatants also join willingly out of political frustration or a lack of 
viable alternatives. Involuntary recruitment is pursued in the form of abductions and luring 
people through false promises of free education, employment and business opportunities.102 The 
group has also recruited a considerable number of child soldiers.103 In the late 1990s, at its peak, 
ADF-NALU cadres numbered an estimated 4,000-5,000.104 According to Ugandan authorities 
and UN sources, the ADF had an estimated strength between 1,200 and 1,500 fighters in late 
2013.105 This drop in numbers is partly attributable to the breakup of the ADF-NALU alliance in 
2007 and is also influenced by recent military offensives in the Rwenzori borderland.  
 The ADF has access to multiple sources of financing. The group maintains an extensive 
business network mainly concentrated in Congolese towns such as Butembo, Beni and Oiche in 
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North Kivu, but also extending to areas in Uganda and Rwanda. The militants rely on this 
network for funding, cross-border trading and the timely provision of material support such as 
food, clothing and medicine to ADF training camps.106  Businesses controlled by the ADF range 
from pharmacies to motorcycle taxi companies and to stores selling a variety of retail goods; 
such interactions  make it easier for the group to embed itself in the local economy.107 Some 
ADF members engage in agricultural activity and trade their produce in the local market.108 The 
harvesting of timber and coffee in areas of control is a particularly lucrative avenue of raising 
funds. The group has in place an elaborate system of taxation for those who harvest timber. The 
aforementioned business networks are often instrumental in illegally exporting timber and coffee 
to Uganda. Some sources also suggest that the ADF has controlled small gold mines in the 
area.109 Moreover, the movement allegedly receives funding through international money 
transfers from Kenya, Tanzania and the UK.110   
 In its early years, the ADF obtained substantial financial and logistical assistance from 
the Sudanese government and the Congolese regime of Mobutu. The Sudanese government has a 
long history of supporting rebel groups attempting to overthrow the Museveni regime in Uganda, 
mainly as a response to the Ugandan government’s support of the secessionist Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA). Hence, Sudan’s support of the ADF was fairly predictable in this 
context.111 As for Congolese support, Mobutu extended sanctuary and other forms of support to 
the ADF such as military equipment and intelligence as the movement represented a “counter-
force to the growing Rwandan-Ugandan collaboration against Hutu militias in eastern Congo.”112  
 
ADF in the context of the greater Congolese conflict 
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The wider Congolese conflict, popularly known as the Great Lakes Crisis, is actually the 
combination of a number of conflicts.  The first began with the arrival of Rwandan Hutu after the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994, an event that disrupted already tenuous relations between Congolese 
ethnic groups.  With the influx of two million refugees in the span of a few months, local 
conflicts over land exacerbated and ethnic groups mobilized around those most similar, creating 
a zero-sum situation where defeat was akin to a death sentence. To compound matters, the 
instability in the1990s occurred during a period of political turbulence in the DRC. The toppling 
of Mobutu in 1997 and his replacement by the Kabila regime prolonged the climate of political 
volatility. This was a period when fighting intensified, especially between Congolese Hutu and 
Rwandan Hutu, in addition to ongoing skirmishes between various ethnic groups such as the 
Mende and Hima in the North and South Kivu regions that bordered Rwanda and Uganda.  By 
this time, the fighting had gone beyond ethnic conflict and involved localized political, economic 
and military motivations and attracted fighters from neighboring states, and some from as far 
away as South Africa and Libya. 113 
The emergence and entrenchment of the ADF in the Rwenzori borderland has to be 
considered in the context of the above geopolitical crises.  Before long, the ADF-NALU alliance 
became “part and parcel of a growing regional war complex.”114 The increasing lack of state 
control in eastern Congo expanded the geographic space available to the ADF. The multitude of 
armed actors on the ground led to constantly shifting alliances and provided the ADF with scope 
to forge opportunistic alliances with various armed groups in the region such as the Hutu 
Interahamwe and the Mai-Mai militias.115 Such coalitions were motivated at times by practical 




Explaining ADF’s lack of ties with other Islamists 
 As discussed earlier, whether or not a relationship develops and sustains between Islamist 
militant groups is predicated on several factors. These include the extent of ideological 
divergence, degree of relevance to the local community and the fear of attracting new enemies. 
In the case of the ADF, each of these factors is highly relevant in understanding why meaningful 
ties between the group and other Jihadists have not materialized.  
 
Importance of Islamic ideology in the ADF 
The ADF is associated with the Salaf Tabligh sect and often labeled as a militant Islamist 
movement by the Ugandan authorities. Moreover, many academic and policy reports also 
describe the ADF through a primarily Islamist lens.117 As previously mentioned, Mukulu is a 
strong adherent of Salafi thought and has expressed his desire to establish an Islamist state in 
Uganda. The 2015 report by the UN panel of experts on the DRC reveals that the ADF carried 
out Islamic instruction in its training camps, utilized a legal system based on the Koran and 
forcefully converted its abductees to Islam. Indeed, failure to convert was often punishable by 
death.118 Moreover, Hellyer observes that Muslim women in the ADF camps that she visited 
increasingly wore more conservative attire. 119 
The above description provides a brief snapshot of the Islamic character of the ADF. 
However, Scorgie-Porter argues forcefully that an exclusive focus on the religious aspect 
provides a limited and inaccurate account of the group’s motives and strategies and neglects 
other strands important to the development of the ADF. She questions the salience of Salafi 
ideology to the organization in general and observes that “ADF camps have been Islamicized to 
different degrees.”120  
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Some suggest that the group was mainly driven by a political agenda of removing the 
Museveni regime and used its Islamic identity instrumentally. A former ADF militant 
interviewed by Hovil and Werker contended that “the agenda of the ADF was purely 
political…the ADF adapted the grievances of Islam in order to appeal to these people. Islam was 
a ticket, so the leaders disguised their political motives in religion.”121 Titeca and Vlassenroot 
resist reducing the role of Islam to instrumental usage, but suggest that the religious reference co-
existed with other agendas such as regime change. Further, they contend that the movement’s 
agendas have changed over time, possibly influenced by its long sojourn in the DRC.  For 
instance, during recent peace talks, the principal ADF demands revolved around socioeconomic 
issues such as reintegration of demobilized soldiers rather than effecting regime change or 
Islamic governance.122   
In a similar vein, the ADF has been described as a multi-layered entity comprising 
several different elements with varying agendas. While the Tabligh network has served a vital 
role in recruitment and was largely responsible for securing funds from multiple Islamic charities 
and foreign countries during the formative stages of ADF’s existence, the group is considerably 
less reliant on the Tabligh now for recruitment and particularly for funding.  Recruitment in the 
ADF has also been heavily contingent on non-religious factors such as the exploitation of deep-
seated perceptions of marginalization, poverty and the lack of alternative opportunity in the 
Rwenzori borderland. As described earlier, ADF’s economic embeddedness in the local 
community provides the group with its primary avenues of funding and material support at 
present and the group’s financial contributions from Islamic sources have considerably dwindled 
over time.123  
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Global Jihadists benefit from a partnership with local Islamists as it affords them the 
opportunity to export their ideology to a wider audience. Given that less than 10% of the 
population is Muslim in ADF’s chief operating environment in eastern Congo, it is unclear how 
foreign Jihadists would benefit from a union with the ADF. Also,  the region is populated by a 
number of militant groups, none of which is fighting to establish Islamist control; making it 
difficult to develop a following large enough to sustain efforts to establish Sharia Law or 
encourage global Jihad.  Moreover, the ADF’s immediate operating environment shows very few 
signs of radicalization. The group has often recruited from the Muslim communities in Bunia and 
Beni in North Kivu. Such communities have long interacted with their Muslim counterparts in 
Kenya and Somalia, yet, there is little evidence of the presence of Muslim extremists in these 
two towns.124 As the Grand Imam of COMICO, a prominent Muslim organization in the DRC 
observed, “the tolerant nature of the Congolese Islamic faith will reduce the chances of extremist 
tendencies emerging in the DRC.”125    
Ideological disagreements often arise within the Jihadi community over the identification 
of the primary enemy.  The ADF has overwhelmingly favored attacks on the “near enemy” – the 
Museveni regime in Uganda rather than focusing on the “far enemy” as preferred by global 
Jihadists. According to data collected by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), all 37 attacks 
attributed to the ADF from 2013 to the end of 2014 were carried out in the DRC or Uganda and 
focused on local targets, in other words, the “near enemy.”126 Similarly, while some ADF leaders 
trumpet aspirations of Islamic governance in Uganda, very few concrete steps have been taken in 
that direction.  
Some sources do suggest that elements of Al-Qaeda had sporadic ties with the ADF in 
the 1990s and provided some financial assistance.127 Reportedly, bin Laden even met Mukulu 
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while they were both in Sudan in the early 1990s.128 Similarly, there has been occasional 
correspondence with Al-Shabaab operatives.  However, such ties have been infrequent and it is 
likely to remain that way unless the movement displays a greater willingness to act on behalf of 
an explicit Jihadist agenda.  
Mukulu’s tape recorded sermons are often inflammatory and lash out at the Ugandan and 
Western governments. In one such recording, he railed, "Let curses be to Bush, Blair, the 
president of France and more curse goes to Museveni and all those fighting Islam." In another, 
he proclaimed that “Muslims should kill non-Muslims, and kill also Muslims who are not 
fighting for Jihad.”129  Based on Mukulu’s interpretation of Sharia law, the ADF has imposed 
brutal penalties for transgressions. For instance, those attempting to escape ADF camps were 
beheaded or crucified.130 His seemingly hardline position on the takfir issue and penchant for 
violent retribution could also alienate potential Jihadi partners as they worry about the 
repercussions of indiscriminately targeting civilians.  
It is apparent that a hardcore Salafi Jihadist agenda is not the exclusive focus of the ADF. 
Not a single attack attributed to the ADF in the last two years has been against the “far enemy” 
and the group operates in an area with little history of Islamic extremism and littered with a 
potpourri of insurgent movements with no interest in furthering Jihadist goals. Hence, it is not 
surprising that the group has not cultivated deep ties with foreign Jihadists. Mukulu’s pending 
extradition from Tanzania and a likely long jail sentence in Uganda will soon necessitate a 
change in leadership.  Unless the new leaders dramatically change course, the present ideological 
gulf will preclude the ADF from forging meaningful alliances with global and regional Jihadists.  
 
Salience to local community 
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 Empirical evidence suggests that an alliance between foreign and local Jihadists is more 
likely to sustain if it resonates with the needs and objectives of the local population. In the case 
of the ADF, the group has become increasingly integrated with the local community in the 
eastern Congo and undergone a gradual process of “Congolization.”  The ADF developed an 
extensive commercial network that allowed it to exploit the vibrant cross-border informal trade 
that connects many Ugandan and Congolese communities. This includes the establishment of ties 
with both Ugandan and Congolese government and military officials to facilitate the transfer of 
resources out of the DRC and into the regional and, ultimately, global markets.131  The relative 
absence of state control on both sides of the border facilitated free movement of goods and 
people. In essence, a parallel economy emerged that has maintained the financial viability of the 
ADF, contributed to the economic life of the region and introduced a semblance of cohabitation 
between the ADF and the local population.132  
Cultural affinity between the Bakonjo in western Uganda and the Banande in eastern 
DRC allowed ADF fighters to feel “they were within their own community” amongst the 
Banande. 133 Moreover, high rates of inter-marriage expedited the pace of “Congolization.” In 
particular, many Ugandan born children of ADF fighters, who fled with their parents to eastern 
DRC in the 1990s, have married Congolese citizens.134 Today, the majority of ADF members are 
Congolese and it is difficult to conceive of the movement as “Ugandan” or “foreign.”135 Further, 
the local Muslim community has generally been supportive to the ADF and provided places of 
worship and opportunities for recruitment and financing.136  
The prevailing conflict environment in the DRC led to a proliferation of rebel movements 
in the region; this, allied with the ADF’s socio-economic embeddedness in the local community, 
provided the group with a “bountiful supply of potential partners in crime.”137 While the ADF 
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had a prolonged partnership with NALU spanning over a decade, more fleeting collaboration has 
been reported with multiple other groups including the Hutu Interahamwe, Mai-Mai rebels and 
the Lendu militia in Ituri. Such tactical alliances developed for a variety of reasons and some 
even emerged after the formal ending of the Second Congolese War in 2003. 138   
While the ADF did carry out intermittent acts of violence against civilians, the 
arrangement between the ADF and the local community, at least until 2013, was one of 
“cooperative (if oftentimes) reluctant coexistence.”139 In general, the ADF respected the 
“traditional hierarchy of the host communities” and in 2011, was estimated to command “the 
popular support of nearly half of the population of Beni territory.”140  The intensity of ADF 
attacks against civilians in eastern Congo has drastically escalated in the last two years. The 
change in tactics is likely due to a couple of reasons. First, offensive operations against ADF 
positions have intensified. Buoyed by a series of successful operations against the M23, a group 
that had occupied the city of Goma for nearly two weeks in late 2012,141 MONUSCO and the 
Congolese army began targeting ADF positions in and around Beni in early 2014. As the ADF 
suffered heavy losses, the group carried out numerous reprisal attacks on civilian informants 
alleged to have collaborated with the UN and Congolese forces.142 This, in turn, led to the further 
deterioration of ADF’s already uneasy relationship with the local community. Second, as the 
ADF increased its violence against civilians, local assistance has been harder to obtain and the 
group has resorted to more coercive and brutal methods to maintain its influence in the region.143 
As one scholar noted, “people are being punished and killed when they don’t want to 
collaborate” with the ADF. 144 
The foregoing summary of ADF’s relations with locals in eastern Congo is important to 
understand why any potential collaboration between the ADF and foreign Islamist militants is 
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unlikely to be welcomed by the local community.  As previously noted, preference divergence 
obstructs the meaningful development of robust ties between local and global Jihadists. 
Certainly, the preferences of transnational Islamists like Al-Qaeda or ISIS are very differently 
aligned with those of the ADF.  The recent violence against civilians notwithstanding, the ADF 
still maintains deep-rooted ties with local economic, political and military elites. For instance, 
elements of the Congolese army are frequently accused of colluding with the ADF in terms of 
timber trafficking and extorting money from local farmers.145  Further, the ADF also maintains 
ties with political elites, as evidenced by their participation in recent peace talks with the 
Ugandan government.146 Such preferences may be incompatible with global Jihadists such as Al-
Qaeda who tend to avoid any kind of engagement with secular political authorities and worry 
that involvement in the illicit economy may dilute the ideological purity of their agenda.  While 
the ADF is most definitely not the only Jihadist group to engage in illicit economic activities, 
this facet, coupled with the group’s lack of a coherent religious or political agenda remain 
significant barriers to preference convergence with global Jihadists.  
Preferences of the foreign Jihadists also diverge considerably with those of the civilian 
masses in eastern Congo. The presence of Islamist foreign fighters with their clarion calls of 
unleashing a holy Jihad is likely to unnerve the locals in an overwhelmingly Christian region that 
embraces very different cultural traditions. Civilians may also worry about the maintenance of 
existing economic networks cultivated over a number of years. Furthermore, ADF’s previously 
manageable ties with the local community have degenerated to unprecedented lows given the 
group’s recent indiscriminate targeting of civilians. In this context, it is unfathomable that the 
acquisition of a potential partner that may unleash further violence upon civilians would be 
viewed favorably by the local community. 
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Given ADF’s history of forging opportunistic ties with militants in eastern Congo, one 
may wonder whether the group may contemplate a similar dalliance with one or more Jihadist 
groups active in Africa. Although such a possibility cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely that the 
relationship would endure, even if it were to emerge.  Further, as Scorgie points out, while the 
ADF interacted with various militant forces in the region, they “by no means ‘swallowed’ them 
to make one homogeneous group.” The numerous groups operating in the region have been able 
to maintain their own independent identity, ideology and modus operandi even as they 
coordinated with each other on attacks and training. 147 For instance, there is little evidence that 
the ADF attempted to impose its Salafist ideology on its former colleagues in NALU. In contrast, 
it is doubtful whether the ADF would be afforded a similar level of autonomy were they to form 
an alliance with foreign Jihadists given the latter’s unrelenting focus on a global agenda.  
 
Fear of attracting new enemies 
Affiliation with global Jihadists is likely to be less alluring to groups such as the ADF, 
especially given the likelihood of attracting unwanted attention from the international 
community. The Ugandan government has consistently attempted to link the ADF to global 
Jihadi groups such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. For example, in 2002, Museveni alleged that 
Al-Qaeda plotted to assassinate him in 1999 via the ADF. He also accused bin Laden of arming 
the ADF.148 In 2005, a top military leader suggested that ADF leader Mukulu was likely to 
become Africa’s next bin Laden.149 The government has also claimed that Mukulu was Al-
Qaeda’s second in command in East Africa. Partly due to the efforts of the Ugandan government, 
the United States included the ADF in its “Terrorist Exclusion List” in December 2001, though 
the group was removed from the list four years later.150 Subsequently, in 2011, the US 
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Department of the Treasury designated ADF leader Mukulu as a terrorist in and the same office 
sanctioned the ADF for its direct targeting of children in 2014.151 
In spite of the Ugandan government’s allegations, little concrete evidence has been 
uncovered linking the ADF with foreign Islamists. Scholars suggest that Museveni’s regime has 
a vested interest in embellishing real or perceived links between the ADF and foreign Jihadists. 
First, it allows the regime to deflect attention from its authoritarian tendencies and project itself 
as a key ally in the US led war on terror; in turn, making it easier to attract American military 
and diplomatic assistance. Second, exaggerating links also justifies the maintenance of high 
levels of military spending and gives the government a convenient alibi to continue raids on the 
eastern DRC where it has a range of interests.152  
The development of verifiable and more ostensible links with foreign Islamists would no 
doubt encourage the Ugandan regime to redouble its efforts to portray the ADF as being 
inextricably linked to global Jihadists.  Therefore, from the ADF’s vantage point, the fear of 
attracting new enemies may serve as an effective deterrent against the development of robust 
linkages, particularly given the limited benefits of an alliance. This also serves to dissuade Al-
Qaeda from aligning with the ADF as it would bring about unnecessary attention to the group in 
a part of the world where Islam is not as prevalent as in places such as Nigeria, Mali and other 
cases mentioned above. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study has sought to explain the absence of linkages between certain locally based 
Salafi Jihadist organizations and their larger, more transnational counterparts such as Al-Qaeda 
or ISIS. In spite of the abundance of empirical literature on Jihadi alliances, the question of why 
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inter-Jihadi ties are completely absent or tenuous at times is under-theorized. Given ISIS’s recent 
inexorable advance through the Middle East and North Africa and its ever growing ties with 
local Jihadists, it is timely to investigate under what conditions locally based militant Islamists 
are less likely to forge ties with their more transnational counterparts.  
 This research answers the above question through a detailed examination of the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF). There is little concrete evidence that the ADF has cultivated any 
substantive linkages with foreign Jihadists. The study posits that the absence of ties is primarily 
due to three main factors. First, while the ADF retains a nominally Salafi Jihadist outlook, it is 
clear that Islam is not the exclusive focus of the group. The heterogeneous composition of the 
ADF has led to the interplay of diverse agendas and motives. The group also operates in a region 
that is predominately Christian, making it difficult to recruit based on ideological grounds. 
Moreover, ideological distance on issues such as enemy identification and establishment of 
Sharia law weakens the likelihood of meaningful ties.  
Second, the ADF has become thoroughly immersed in the local Congolese community 
through a well-developed commercial enterprise and beneficial ties with political and military 
elites, giving rise to a parallel economy. Cultural similarities and inter-marriage have also 
facilitated the process of “Congolization.” The coexistence between the ADF and the local 
community has been severely strained in recent times due to indiscriminate acts of violence by 
the ADF against civilians. Given this context of rapidly worsening ties, an entrenched 
relationship with transnational Islamists could further aggravate already high levels of tensions 
and is unlikely to resonate favorably with the local community. 
Finally, more verifiable ties with external Islamist militants will likely invite ADF more 
attention from the Ugandan authorities as well as other regional/global actors. Therefore, the fear 
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of attracting new enemies may serve as an effective deterrent against the development of robust 
linkages. Further, while the ADF is not significant on a global level, it has garnered the attention 
of regional governments, suggesting the risks of committing resources to the region are not 
worth the costs for global Jihadists such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. 
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